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Abstract 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it focuses on the decisional process 
that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms through 
which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm. In particular, our aim is to study the role 
and  the  nature  of  Normative  and  Empirical  Expectations  and  their  influence  on  people’s 
decisions. The tool is the Exclusion Game, a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. It represents a 
situation  where  3 subjects  – players A  -  have to decide  how to  allocate  a  sum  S  among 
themselves and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. The experiment 
consists of three treatments. In the Baseline Treatment participants are randomly distributed 
in groups of four players and play the Exclusion Game. In the Agreement Treatment in each 
group participants are invited to vote for a specific non-binding allocation rule before playing 
the Exclusion Game. In the Outsider Treatment, after the voting procedure and before playing 
the Exclusion Game, a player A for each group (the outsider) is reassigned to a different 
group and instructed about the rule chosen by the new group. In all the treatments, at the end 
of the game and before players are informed about the decisions taken during the Exclusion 
Game by the other co-players, first order and second order expectations (both normative and 
empirical)  are  elicited  through  a  brief  questionnaire.  The  first  result  we  obtained  is  that 
subjects’ choices are in line with their empirical (not normative) expectations. The second 
result is that even a non-binding agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations – 
and, consequently, of choices. The third results is that expectation of conformity is higher in 
the partner protocol. This implies that a single outsider breaks the ‘trust and cooperation’ 
equilibrium. 
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Introduction 
In the fields of experimental economics and behavioural game theory one of 
the most studied topic is subjects’ reaction when  a cooperation norm  or a 
redistribution norm is violated. This implies that the experimental literature 
concerning norms mainly corresponds to studies on norms of fairness and, 
consequently, on punishment of defectors (f.i., Fehr and Gächter, 2000, for 
second-party  punishment;  Fehr  and  Fischbacher,  2004,  for  third-party 
punishment).  A  further  implication  of  these  studies  is  that  updating  the 
classical figure of the Homo Oeconomicus by introducing more sophisticated 
preferences (inequity aversion, reciprocity, altruism, spitefulness, and so on
1) 
into the economic theories is sufficient to explain the experimental results.  
Mostly unexplored, both at the empirical and at the theoretical level, is the 
issue of compliance with norms prescribing non-selfish choices in contexts in 
which  i)  sanctions  (or  rewards)  can  not  be  implemented;  ii)  reputational 
mechanisms and endogenous sanctions can not be effective, due to ex-post 
non-verifiability or simply to the fact that the game is one shot.  
As  shown  by  Faillo  and  Sacconi  (2007),  in  these  cases  theories  of  social 
preferences and reciprocity fail in explaining the decision to comply with the 
norm.  A  contribution  in  dealing  with  this  issue  comes  from  non-
consequentialist  theories,  like  the  ones  devised  by  Sacconi  and  Grimalda 
(2007)
2 and Bicchieri (2006). A common assumption of these theories is that 
in a strategic interaction amongst N players, player i's decision to comply with 
a  shared  norm,  which  dictates  a  choice  in  contrast  with  her  material  self-
interest, depends on her beliefs about other N-1 players’ willingness to comply 
(conditional compliance hypothesis).  
Sacconi  and  Grimalda  (2007)  develop  a  model  of  conformist  preferences 
based  on  psychological  game  theory.  According  to  this  model,  a  player 
characterized  by  conformist  preferences  complies  if  she  participates  in 
choosing the norm in a social contract setting, she expects that other players 
                                                
1 See Fehr and Schmidt (2000), Camerer (2003). 
2 See also Grimalda and Sacconi (2005).   3 
who have contributed to choose the rule will comply (First Order Empirical 
Expectations)  and  she  expect  that  others  will  expect  that  she  will  comply 
(Second  Order  Empirical  Expectations).  Experimental  evidence  compatible 
with this model has been collected by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) who show 
that the introduction of a non-binding agreement on a division rule influences 
individual  expectations  and  choice.  In  particular,  they  observe  that  for  a 
significant number of subjects the agreement seems to represent a sufficient 
condition to expect reciprocal conformity and therefore to conform to the rule.  
Bicchieri (2006) devises a theory according to which compliance is observed 
when  the  player  is  aware  of  existence  of  the  norm,  she  believes  that  a 
sufficiently  large  number  of  people  comply  with  the  norm  (First  Order 
Empirical Expectations); and either a sufficiently large number of people think 
that she ought to conform or a sufficiently large number of people are ready to 
sanction  her  for  not  conforming  (Second  Order  Normative  Expectations). 
Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) run an experiment in which they show that when 
normative expectations (what we believe others think ought to be done) and 
empirical expectations (what we expect others actually do) are in contrast, 
subjects choose according to the latter
3. 
 
In  our  paper  we  give  a  closer  look  at  the  relation  between  individual 
expectations and the decision to comply with a norm. We consider the case of 
a non-binding norm that is chosen through an agreement amongst agents who 
vote behind a veil of ignorance, and who interact in a one-shot game in which 
they decide whether to comply or not with the rule.  
We investigate on four types of expectations of a generic player i: 
First  Order  Empirical  Expectations  (FOEE):  player  i’s  beliefs  about  other 
players’ choice. 
Second Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE): player i’s beliefs about other 
players’ beliefs about her choice. 
                                                
3  Further  evidence  on  the  role  of  empirical  and  normative  expectations  in  fostering  
compliance with norms of fairness can be found  in a recent paper by Krupka and Weber 
(2007).    4 
First Order Normative Expectations (FONE): player i’s beliefs about what is 
the right choice in a particular situation. 
Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE): player i’s beliefs about what 
other players consider as the right choice in a particular situation. 
 
Our objective is to study how these different types of expectations contribute 
in  explaining  the  decision  to  comply  with  a  shared  norm.  We  consider  a 
simple game, and we start by studying the relationship between choice and 
expectations.  To  do  this  we  observe  how  subjects  play  the  game  and  we 
collect data on what they believe others will do and expect. We add then an 
analysis of how the introduction (before the actual play of the game) of an 
agreement on a non-binding division rule influences subjects’ expectations, 
and consequently the way in which the game is played. Finally, we consider 
the case in which subjects play the game with co-players who are not those 
with whom they participated in the agreement. 
 As it will become clearer in the following pages, these steps correspond to the 
three treatments of our experimental design: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Agreement Treatment (AT), and the Outsider Treatment (OT). The BT gives 
us general information about the relationship between choice and empirical 
and normative expectations. The comparison between what we observe in BT 
and AT allows us to examine the influence of the agreement on expectations 
and  choice.  Finally  by  comparing  the  AT  with  OT  we  can  assess  the 
importance of actual participation in the agreement for the decision to comply 
with the norm. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  experimental  design,  procedure  and 
hypotheses  are  presented  in  Section  2;  results  are  analyzed  in  Section  3; 
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2. Experimental Design 
The tool is the Exclusion Game (Sacconi and Faillo, 2005; Faillo and Sacconi, 
2007), a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. It represents a situation where 3 
subjects  –  players  A  -  have  to  decide  how  to  allocate  a  sum  S  among 
themselves and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. In 
particular, each player A has to decide the amount she wants to ask for herself 
choosing one of three possible strategies: asking 25%, 30% or 33% of S. The 
payoff of players A is exactly the sum asked for themselves (a1, a2 and a3 
respectively), while the payoff of player B is the remaining sum (S – a1 – a2 – 
a3). In our experiment, each group is give 60 tokens – each token corresponds 
to € 0,50 - and each player A’s strategies are : “Ask for 15 tokens”, “Ask for 
18 tokens”, “Ask for 20 tokens”. 
The experiment consists of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Agreement Treatment (AT) and the Outsider Treatment (OT).  
In the BT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and 
play the Exclusion Game.  
In the AT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and 
are  instructed  about  the  stages  of  the  experiment  and  about  the  Exclusion 
Game.  In  the  first  stage,  before  knowing  their  role  in  the  game,  they  are 
involved in a voting procedure. In each group participants are invited to vote 
for a specific allocation rule. In particular, subjects must vote one out of three 
alternative  division  rules  (the  forth  number  is  player  B’s  payoff):  {15,15, 
15,15},{18,18, 18,6}, {20,20, 20,0}. The first rule assigns the same payoff to 
every member of the group; the second rule corresponds to a partial inclusion 
of player B in sharing the wealth; the third rule implies the total exclusion of 
player  B. Players must reach a  unanimous agreement on the rule within a 
limited numbers of trials (10 in our experiment). The voting is computerized 
and  completely  anonymous.  The  agreement  is  not  binding,  but  failure  in 
reaching it is costly, since only groups who reach an agreement in this first 
stage have the chance to participate to the second stage. In the second stage the   6 
composition of the groups is unchanged and roles are randomly assigned to 
implement the Exclusion Game. In this case, players A can decide either to 
implement  the  voted  rule  or  to  choose  one  of  the  alternative  allocations. 
Players who do not enter the second stage wait for the end of the session. 
Their payoff is the show-up fee.  
In the OT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and 
are  instructed  about  the  stages  of  the  experiment  and  about  the  Exclusion 
Game. The first stage as well as the rule to enter the second stage are the same 
as in the AT. At the beginning of the second stage, players are informed about 
their role and groups are rematched. In particular, a player A for each group 
(the outsider) is reassigned to a different group and instructed about the rule 
chosen by the new group, while the other members of the group ignore the rule 
she voted for in her previous group. After the re-matching, subjects participate 
in the Exclusion Game. Also in this case players who do not enter the second 
stage wait for the end of the session and they are paid only the show-up fee. 
For a summary see Figure 1. 
 
2.1 Experimental Procedure.  
The  experiment  was  run  both  in  Milan  (EELAB  –  University  of  Milan 
Bicocca) and in Trento (CEEL – University of Trento)
 4. We ran 3 sessions for 
the BT (1 in Milan and 2 in Trento), 4 sessions for the AT (2 in Milan and 2 in 
Trento), 5 sessions for the OT (3 in Milan and  2 in  Trento). Overall, 216 
undergraduate students – 104 in Milan and 112 in Trento – participated in the 
experiment. A more detailed description of the sessions is in Table 1. 
                                                
4 At University of Trento subjects were recruited by posting ads at various departments. Ads 
were  posted  one  week  before  the  experiment.  Subscriptions  by  students  interested  in 
participating  in  the  experiment  have  been  collected  by  the  staff  of  the  Computable  and 
Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. 
At  University  of  Milano-Bicocca  subjects  were  recruited  by  email.  They  were  students 
included in the mailing list of the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of 
Milano-Bicocca (EELAB). Two weeks before the experiment they received an email in which 
the staff invited them to visit the Laboratory’s website for information about the experiment 
and subscriptions.   7 
The  experiment  was  programmed  and  conducted  with  the  software  z-Tree 
(Fischbacher,  2007).  The  instructions  were  read  by  participants  on  their 
computer screen while an experimenter read them loudly.  
After  reading  the  instructions  and  before  subjects  were  invited  to  take 
decisions, some control questions were asked in order to be sure that players 
understood the rules of the game. At the end of each session, subjects were 
asked to fill in a brief survey to check for socio – demographic data. 
Players were given a show – up fee of 3 euro.  
 
2.2 Beliefs elicitation.  
In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players were informed 
about the decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, 
first order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) were 
elicited through a brief questionnaire. In particular, in each group each player 
made a statement:  
1. of the probabilities related to each possible choice of co-players A (First 
Order Empirical Expectations);  
2. of the probability related to each co-players’ possible judgement about her 
own choice (Second Order Empirical Expectations);  
3. of the choice should have been taken by a representative player A (First 
Order Normative Expectations) ;  
4.  of  the choice  that co-players  consider as  the  ‘right’  one  (Second  Order 
Normative Expectations) 
5. 
Both in the AT and in the OT only players who entered the second stage were 
interviewed  about  their  expectations.  Moreover,  in  the  OT  guesses  on 
behaviour and beliefs of partners and outsiders were asked separately. 
Only good guesses of the Empirical Expectations were rewarded through a 
quadratic scoring rule (Davis and Holt, 1993) 
6.   8 
2.3 Experimental Hypotheses.  
Hypothesis  1  (H1):  According  to  psychological  game  theory  models
7, 
individual preferences depend on their expectations (of different orders and 
nature). Consequently, individuals’ choices in the Exclusion Game could be 
explained in terms of their expectations about others’ behaviour. Moreover, if 
Bicchieri  and  Xiao  (2007)  are  right,  when  normative  and  empirical 
expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more relevant role in players’ 
decisional process. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In treatments AT and OT agreement should be reached by 
all the groups since it is not binding but its failure is costly (failure would 
prevent them to enter the second stage of the experiment). 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): According to both conformist preferences and Bicchieri’s 
theories,  the  possibility  of  agreeing  with  a  distributive  norm  enhances 
compliance by inducing  a convergence of  individual expectations. In  other 
words,  compliance  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  emergence  of  reciprocal 
expectations of conformity due to the agreement.  
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): According to Bicchieri’s theory, subjects will comply if 
i) they believe that other members of their group will comply (First Order 
Empirical Expectations compatible with the choice dictated by the rule) and if 
ii) they believe that other members of the group think that complying is the 
right thing to do (Second Order Normative Expectations compatible with the 
choice dictated by the rule).  
 
                                                                                                                           
5 See appendix 1 for details on the belief elicitation procedure. 
6 We used the scoring rule: 
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Where  Ik  takes value 1 if the realized event is the event k and 0 otherwise. pk is the probability 
associated with event k. The maximum score is a, and the minimum score is a-2b. We chose  
a=2 e b=1.   
7 See for example Geanakoplos et al. (1989); Rabin, (1993).   9 
Hypothesis  3b  (H3b):  According  to  Sacconi  and  Grimalda,  subjects  will 
comply if i) they participate in the agreement on the rule, ii) they believe that 
other members of their group will comply (First Order Empirical Expectations 
compatible with the choice dictated by the rule) and if iii) they believe that 
other members of the group expect they will comply (Second Order Empirical 
Expectations compatible with the choice dictated by the rule).  
 
3. Data analysis 
In this section we want to give an overview of our experimental data and 
results by discussing two main points. Firstly, we want to analyse the relation 
between beliefs and behaviour. In particular, we want to check whether beliefs 
influence subjects’ decisional process. Secondly, we want to test whether and 




Overall, 216 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. 56 players 
were  recruited  for  the  BT,  72  for  the  AT  and  88  for  the  OT.  We  have 
observations of 42 subjects A in the BT, 54 in the AT and 66 in the OT.  
In the BT, players A mostly chose to ask the highest amount of tokens (20) – 
73.8% against 21.4% who choose 18 and 4.8% who chose 15. Both in the AT 
and in the OT the situation is different. In the AT, 37% , 16.7% and 46.3% 
chose respectively 20, 18 and 15. In the OT the percentages are 54.5%, 12.1% 
and 33.4%. 
Concerning  the  voted  rule,  the  15-15-15-15  one  seems  to  be  the  preferred 
option both in the AT and in the OT. In particular, 17 groups out of 18 in the 
AT and 20 out of 22 in the OT chose the fair-division rule. The 18-18-18-6 
rule has been chosen by 2 groups in the AT, while only 1 group in the OT 
chose the 20-20-20-0 rule. 50% of players in the AT and 39.4% in the OT 
complied to the voted rule when playing the Exclusion Game. 
   10 
3.2 Results 
Result 1. Subjects’ choices are in line with their expectations. 
If we check whether there is any correlation between beliefs and decisions, it 
turns  out  that  most  players’  choices  are  in  line  with  either  empirical  or 
normative expectations (Table 2)
8 
However - as in Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) - when normative and empirical 
expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more relevant role in players’ 
decisional process (Table 3) and they are significantly correlated to subjects’ 
choices  (Spearman  test;  p  <  0.03).  This  is  not  the  case  when  we  analyse 
normative expectations (Spearman test; p > 0.17).
9 
 
Result 2. When agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. 
As we expected, when agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. This 
is a quite obvious result: agreement is not binding but a failure in reaching it is 
expensive. However, the real interesting point is the fact that the fair rule 15-
15-15-15 seems to be a sort of focal point (see Table 4). What does it mean? 
Let us look at the results of the first voting attempt. From Table 5 it emerges 
that 75% of players in the AT and 70% of players in the OT indicate as their 
first choice the 15-15-15-15 rule. If we run a binomial test (choosing the 15-
15-15-15 rule against choosing another rule) it turns out that these values are 
significant (p = 0.000 in the AT and p = 0.04 in the OT). This may imply that 
most of people perfectly know what is right. However, what happens to the 
remaining 25% and 30%? Why do most of them convert themselves? And 
why do, when playing the Exclusion Game, the 50% of subjects in the AT and 
the 61% in the OT decide not to comply with the rule (Table 6)? A possible 
explanation is that ‘unfair’ subjects vote for the non-binding ‘fair’ rule in order 
to end the time-consuming voting procedure. However, this is not enough for 
players who prefer the ‘fair’ rule. They perfectly know that the agreement is 
not binding (in fact, among players who eventually vote for a rule different 
                                                
8 We consider only first order expectations since second order expectations are either equal or 
highly correlated to the former. For a more detailed description, see Appendix 1. 
9 Test run only on observations where FONE and FOEE are different.    11 
from their first choice, 71% do not comply when playing the Exclusion Game) 
and if they think that the other co-players do not comply, probably they will 
defect  as  well.  This  would  be  in  line  both  with  the  fact  that  empirical 
expectation  are  more  relevant  than  normative  ones  and  with  the  higher 
probability of expecting the others will choose 20 (at least in the AT) as soon 
as the number of voting rounds increases (see Appendix 2).  
 
Result 3. Agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations.  
In the BT at least 70% of the players ask 20, while in the AT only 37% of the 
participants  ask  for  the  maximum.  This  difference  is  significant  (Mann-
Whitney
10;  p  =  0.0002).  However,  our  experimental  hypothesis  is  more 
complicated and implies a two-step reasoning process of our participants. Step 
1: the agreement influences players’ empirical expectations. Step 2: empirical 
expectations define subjects’ choices. This means that we want to show that 
the  difference  between BT  and  AT is  a  consequence  of  the  impact  of  the 
agreement on players’ beliefs and preferences.  
In the AT 17 groups out of 18 choose the 15-15-15-15 rule and 1 the 18-
18-18-6 one. If we analyse people’s expectations, it turns out that in the AT 
there is a significant decrease of subjects who think that the other members of 
their group have asked for 20 tokens (Table 7). A probit regression – where 
the dependent variable is the probability of expecting the others have chosen 
20 – shows that subjects’ are more likely to expect a selfish behaviour of the 
co-players in the BT (p = 0.000). A bivariate recursive probit confirms both 
beliefs’ influence on subjects’ decisions (p = 0.00) and the convergence of 
empirical expectations toward a choice in line with the fair rule (p = 0.000).
11 
More details on the econometric analysis in Appendix 2. 
 
Result 4. Expectation of conformity is higher in the partner protocol. 
                                                
10 Independent observations are average choices of each group in order to take account of the 
fact that choices within the same group in the AT are not independent.  
11 This result is perfectly in line with the result obtained by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) through 
a within-subject design.   12 
When we introduce a mixed protocol in which the Exclusion Game is played 
in groups where one subject is an ‘outsider’ (in the OT), a lower percentage of 
players  comply  to  the  chosen  rule  (Table  6).  Again,  our  experimental 
hypothesis implies a two-step reasoning process of our participants. Step 1: the 
introduction of an outsider influences players’ empirical expectations. Step 2: 
empirical expectations define subjects’ choices. This means that, once again, 
we want to show that the difference between AT and OT is a consequence of 
the  impact  of  the  outsider  on  players’  beliefs.  If  we  analyse  people’s 
expectations,  it  turns  out  that  in  the  AT  players  believe  in  co-players’ 
compliance more than in the OT (Table 8). A probit regression – where the 
dependent  variable  is  the  probability  of  expecting  the  others  to  comply  – 
shows  that  subjects  are  more  likely  to  expect  compliance  in  the  AT  (p  = 
0.046).  A  bivariate  recursive  probit  confirms  both  beliefs’  influence  on 
subjects’ decisions (p = 0.012) and the fact that in the OT subjects are more 
likely to expect co-players’ deviation from the chosen rule. (p = 0.051). More 
details on the econometric analysis in Appendix 2. 
 
Result  5.  Sacconi  and  Grimalda  predict  our  players’  behaviour  while 
Bicchieri’s theory seems to be less robust. 
The  previous  analyses  confirms  the  robustness  of  Sacconi  and  Grimalda’s 
theory. According to them FOEE and SOEE should be compatible with the 
choice dictated by the rule. In our data, SOEE are in line with FOEE (see 
result  1).  Moreover,  FOEE  influence  subjects’  decisions  (see  result  3  and 
result 4), and participation in the agreement has a significant impact on the 
decision to comply (result 4.) 
On the other hand, Bicchieri’s theory seems to be less robust. According to 
Bicchieri, both FOEE and SONE in line with the chosen rule are necessary to 
predict compliance. To check this point we isolate the subgroup of subjects 
who comply to the chosen rule and whose FOEE are in line with it. We obtain 
a subgroup of 14 subjects in the AT and 14 subjects in the OT. If we analyse 
the correlation between SONE and choice it turns out that they are correlated 
neither in the AT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p = 0.23) nor among the   13 
insiders in the OT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p = 0.5). They are only 
slightly  correlated  among  the  outsiders  in  the  OT  (Spearman  correlation 
coefficient; p = 0.07), but in this case we have only 6 observations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The aim  of this paper is  twofold. First of all, it focuses on  the  decisional 
process that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the 
mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm.  
We can summarize our results by saying that: 
1)  subjects’  choices  are  in  line  with  their  empirical  expectations,  and 
when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter 
play a more relevant role in players’ decisions (H1);  
2)  Agreement is reached in all groups (H2); 
3)  Even  a  non-binding  agreement  induces  convergence  of  empirical 
expectations and, consequently, of choices (H3). Moreover, it confirms 
the robustness of the results obtained in Faillo and Sacconi (2007). In 
particular,  it  is  perfectly  in  line  with  the  hypothesis  that  subjects 
comply with a norm if they believe that other members of their group 
will comply and if they believe that other members of their groups 
expect they will comply (H3b); 
4) the results of the OT treatment seems to suggest that participation in 
the agreement is a necessary condition for compliance. Insiders do not 
expect  compliance  from  outsiders,  and  consequently  they  do  not 
comply (H3b). Outsiders seem to acknowledge it, and, expecting non-
compliance by the insiders, they do not comply.  
5)  the  last  result  we  obtain  (a  generally  non  significant  correlation 
between  SONE  and  choice  of  conformity)  does  not  confirm  the 
hypothesis that both first order empirical expectations and second order 
normative expectations are necessary conditions for compliance (H3a). 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
 
Treatment  Voting 
Procedure  Matching  Sessions  Subjects 
BT  NO  Partner Protocol  2 in Trento (T) 
1 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 20 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 5 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 15 (M) players 
A) 
AT  YES  Partner Protocol  2 in Trento (T) 
2 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 36 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 9 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 27 (M) players 
A) 
OT  YES 
Mixed – Partner 
and Stranger 
Protocol 
2 in Trento (T) 
3 in Milan (M) 
32 (T) + 56 (M) 
8 groups (T) + 14 groups 
(M) 
(24 (T) + 42 (M) players 
A) 




Table 2. Beliefs and choices 
  It is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour through… 
  FOEE  FONE  OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 27) 








T (N = 27) 








T (N = 24) 








FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
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When FOEE and FONE are different it is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour 
through… 
  FOEE  FONE  OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 14) 








T (N = 11) 








T (N = 14) 







FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
    Rule 
    15 – 15 – 15 – 15    18 – 18 – 18 – 6    20 – 20 – 20 – 0 
AT  88.9%  8/9    11.1%  1/9    0.0%  0/9 
Trento 
OT  87.5%  7/8    12.5%  1/8    0.0%  0/8 
                 
Milano 
AT  100.0%  9/9    0.0%  0/9    0.0%  0/9 
  OT  92.9%  13/14    0.0%  0/14    7.1%  1/14   20 











Table 6. Compliance by University x Treatment.  
  
  AT  OT 












     
AT  44.4%  12/27 
10 rule 15 - 2 rule 18 
OT 
  29.2%  7/24 
OT 
(Insiders)  37.5%  6/16 
5 rule 15 - 1 rule 18 
Trento 
OT 
(Outsiders)  12.5%  1/8 
1 rule 15 
     
AT  55.5%  15/27 
15 rule 15 
OT  45.2%  19/42 
OT 
(Insiders)  39.3%  11/28 




(Outsiders)  57.1%  8/14 
7 rule 15 - 1 rule 20   21 


















    15 - 18    20 
BT 
(N = 27)  15.0%    85.0% 
Trento 
AT 
(N = 27)  20.0%    80.0% 
           
BT 
(N = 15)  52.0%    48.0%  Milano 
AT 
(N = 27)  69.0%    31.0% 
     
AT  40.7%        11/27  Trento 
OT  20.8%         5/24 
   
AT  51.8%        14/27   
Milano 
OT  30.9%        13/42   22 
Appendix 1– The beliefs elicitation procedure 
 
 
Data on subject’s expectations have been collected through a questionnaire. 
We  adopted  two  different  questionnaires,  one  for  the  Baseline  and  the 
Agreement treatments and one for the Outsider treatment.  
 
BASELINE TREATMENT AND AGREEMENT TREATMENT 
 
Let us identify the three active members of the group (players A) as Ax, Ay 
and Az. The questions were exactly the same for the three players. By way of 
example we will take the point of view of player Ax. 
 
1.  First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
“You are the participant Ax. According to you opinion, what is the probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) that Ay has made the following choices: 
 
  CHOICE   PROBABILITY 
 
S/he asked for 15 tokens     [    ] 
 
S/he asked for 18 tokens    [    ] 
 
S/he asked for 20 tokens    [    ] 
 
 
Remember that the three percentages must sum to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold also for player Az. If not 
s/he could enter different values for Az. Thus, each subject answered to two 
questions on FOEE.) 
 
 
2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
“You  are  the  participant  Ax.  Now  we  ask  you  to  assign  a  probability 
(expressed in  percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding  the 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant Ay 
 
  HYPOTHESIS                     PROB. 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 15 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 18 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 20 tokens    [    ]   23 
 
According to Ay, all my three choices are almost equiprobable         [    ] 
  
According to Ay, only two of my three choices are almost equiprobable     [    ] 
 
Remember that the five percentages must sum to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold also for player Az. If not 
s/he  could  enter  different  values  for  Az.  In  this  ways  each  subject  were 




3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What is the right number of tokens s/he 
should ask for?    
 
I think the right number of tokens is 15      [    ] 
 
I think the right number of tokens is 18      [    ] 
 





3 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What do you think is her/his opinion with 
regard to the right number of tokens that a generic participant A should ask 
for? 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 15.        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 18        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 20         [    ] ”  
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OUTSIDER TREATMENT 
 
In this treatment we must distinguish between the members of the group who 
have voted the rule and are still in their original group and the Outsider (the 
subject  who  comes  from  a  different  group).  Let  us  use  “Ax”  and  “Ay”  to 





1. First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You  are  the  participant  Ax  (Ay).  According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the 
probability  (expressed  in  percentage  terms)  that  Ay  (Ax)  has  made  the 
following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“You  are  the  participant  Ax  (Ay).  According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the 
probability (expressed in percentage terms) that AO (the participant coming 
from another group) has made the following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You  are  the  participant  AO.  According  to  your  opinion,  what  is  the 
probability  (expressed  in  percentage  terms)  that  Ay  (Ax)  has  made  the 
following choices: 
 




2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You are the participant Ax (Ay). Now we ask you to assign a probability 
(expressed in  percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding  the 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant Ay(Ax). 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
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“You are the participant Ax (Ay). Now we ask you to assign a probability 
(expressed in  percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding  the 
probabilities  assigned  to  your  choice  by  participant  AO  (the  participant 
coming from another group): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You  are  the  participant  AO.  Now  we  ask  you  to  assign  a  probability 
(expressed in  percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding  the 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant Ax (Ay): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
Questions for the Ax, Ay and AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group. What 
is the right number of tokens that s/he should ask for?  (FONE1) 
  
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is in a group which is not her/his 
original one. What is the right amount of tokens that she/he should ask for?  
(FONE2) 
 




4 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
Questions for the AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What 
do you think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 (SONE1) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
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“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What 
do you think is her/ his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that 
a participant A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 
 (SONE2) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
Think of a  participant  A who is still in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE3) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a  participant A who is still in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant  A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE4) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
  
 
“Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right 
number of tokens that a participant A who is still in her/his original group 
should ask for ?” 
 (SONE5)   
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right 
number of tokens that a participant A who is not in her/his original group 
should ask for ? 
 (SONE6)   
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Subjects were paid only for the accuracy of their guesses in FOEE and SOEE 
questions according the Quadratic Scoring Rule (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
 
 
When  we  detect  the  relation  between  subjects’  choices  and  beliefs,  we 
consider only first order expectations (both empirical and normative). This is 
due to a preliminary analysis on beliefs. First of all, we analyse FOEE and 
SOEE. In particular, we want to check whether what people think the other has 
done was in line with what they think the others expected s/he has done. We 
find  out  that  there  is  no  difference  between  FOEE  and  SOEE  in  all  the   27 
treatments (p < 0.06, Fisher-exact test in the BT; p > 0.45, Wilcoxon test in the 
AT; p > 0.15, Wilcoxon test in the OT).
12 
Then,  we  check  whether  this  is  true  also  when  considering  normative 
expectations. In the BT, it turns out that FONE and SONE are not significantly 
different ( p = 0.000, Fisher-exact test). In the AT, FONE are slightly lower 
than  SONE  (p  =  0.09,  Wilcoxon  test),  but  highly  correlated  (p  =  0.0002, 
Spearman correlation test). In the OT the analysis is a bit more complicated. 
This is due to the fact that we have two different kinds of active players – the 
outsiders  and  the  insiders.  Consequently,  normative  beliefs concern  both  a 
generic insider and a generic outsider rather than a generic player A – as in the 
BT  and  in  the  AT.  This  increases  the  number  of  normative  expectations 
(FONE1, FONE2, SONE1, SONE2, SONE3, SONE4, SONE5 and SONE6) 
and the number of possible comparisons. With respect to the outsiders, we 
compare FONE1 with SONE1 and FONE2 with SONE2. As a results, FONE1 
and SONE1 are not significantly different (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test), while 
FONE2 are slightly lower than SONE2 (p = 0.05, Wilcoxon test). However, 
when  we  compare  SONE2  with  choices,  it  turns  out  that  they  are  not 
significantly correlated (p = 0.41, Spearman correlation test). Concerning the 
insiders, we compare FONE1 with SONE2 and SONE5, as well as FONE2 
with  SONE4  and  with  SONE6.  In  all  cases  it  emerges  that  they  are  not 
significantly different (p > 0.31, Wilcoxon test). Finally, we check whether 
players think that a normative choice does not depend on the role (outsider vs 
insider). We compare FONE1 with FONE2 and we found out that they are not 
significantly different according both the outsiders (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test) 
and the insiders (p = 0.19, Wilcoxon test).  
To sum up, we find that second order expectations are generally in line with 
first order expectations. This allows to study the relation between choices and 
beliefs by taking only first order expectations into account.  
  
                                                
12 We want to point out that when running tests, independence of observations is taken into 
account. In particular, in the BT each player’s observation is independent with respect to all 
the  other  players’  observations.  In  the  AT,  independent  observations  are  group’s  average 
observations.  In  the  OT,  insiders’  independent  observations  are  again  group’s  average 
observations, while outsiders’ independent observations are the average observations of the 
interchanged outsiders.    28 
Appendix 2 – The Econometric Analysis
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1 1 2 1 * 20 _ i i i i i i AT FIRST TENT Age AT FOEE ε δ β β α + + + + =  
(R1) 
 
(R1) is a probit regression we implement to explore what kind of variables 
influence subjects’ probability of expecting the others have chosen 20. The 
dependent variable is the dichotomous variable FOEE_20 that is equal to 1 if a 
subject  expects  the  others  have  chosen  20.  The  control  variables  are  both 
related  to  the  nature  of  the  experiment  (AT,  FIRST*AT,  TENT)  and 
demographic (AGE). We exclude the variable GENDER since it turns out that 
in  the first  two  treatments  GENDER  and  AGE  are  significantly  correlated 
(Pearson coefficient; p < 0.01) – women are significantly older than men (ttest; 
p = 0.002). AT is a dummy equal to 1 if the AT is played. TENT is the number 
of rounds the group voted before reaching a unanimous decision on the rule to 
be  used  –  variable  equal  to  0  when  the  BT  is  played.  FIRST*AT  is  an 
interaction term equal to 0 either when the BT is played or when the player in 
the AT participated in other experiments in the past. 
 
Probit Model – R1  
 
Variables            FOEE_20      Marginal Effects        
 
AT   -2.1***  -0.58       
  (0.478)        
FIRST*AT  -1.29***  -0.47     
  (0.453)    
AGE  -0.10    -0.03 
  (0.073)    
TENT  0.39**    0.13 
  (0.169) 
     
Constant  3.77***   
  (1.643)    
 
N    96         
Log Likelihood    -39891664 
LR chi2(4)    42.43 
Prob > chi2    0.000     
 
***significance 1% 
** significance 5% 
                                                
13 Multicollinearity – a usual problem of probit regressions – has been detected through VIF 
tests.   29 
 
From  (R1)  it  turns  out  that  subjects  are  more  likely  to  expect  a  selfish 
behaviour of the co-players in the BT. Moreover, it emerges that in the AT the 
higher the number of rounds the group voted before reaching a unanimous 
decision on the rule to be used the higher is the probability for the subjects to 
expect a selfish behaviour of the co-players. Finally, in the AT, a player who 
never participated in other experiments in the past has a higher probability of 
asking a sum different from 20. 
 
1 3 2 1 * 20 _ i i i i i i AGE TENT AT FIRST AT FOEE ε β β β α + + + + =  
2 5 4 1 * 20 _ 20 _ i i i i i AGE AT FIRST FOEE CHOICE ε β β δ + + + =  
(R2) 
 
(R2) is a bivariate recursive probit regression
14 where CHOICE_20 is equal to 
1 if subject i chooses 20 tokens. It allows to check: 1) the relation existing 
among  agreement,  beliefs  and  choices;  2)  whether  there  exists  any  latent 
variable that may influence beliefs and choice at the same time. 
 
Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R2 
 
Variables            FOEE_20      CHOICE_20        
 
AT   -2.87***         
  (0.57)         
FIRST*AT  -1.4***  -0.04     
  (0.422)   (0.433) 
AGE  -0.15*   0.11 
  (0.085)   (0.095) 
TENT  0.40** 
  (0.168) 
FOEE_20      2.42*** 
      (0.712) 
     
Constant  8.16***  -4.38* 
  (2.3)    (2.365) 
 
N    96         
Log Likelihood    -73.623096 
Rho    0.287 
Prob > chi2    0.47     
 
***significance 1%  ** significance 5%  *  significance 10% 
                                                
14 A variation of the analysis run by Di Novi (2007).   30 
From (R2) it turns out that the agreement influences empirical expectations 
and that empirical expectations influence subjects’ decisions. Moreover, as rho 
is  not  significantly  different  from  0,  we  can  affirm  that  there  is  no  latent 




1 2 1 i i i i i FIRST TENT OT EQFOEE ν φ φ ω + + + =  
(R3) 
 
(R3) is a probit regression we implement to explore what kind of variables 
influence subjects’ probability of expecting the others have chosen the voted 
rule.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  dichotomous  variable  EQFOEE  that  is 
equal to 1 if a subject expects the others have chosen the voted rule. The 
control variables are all related to the nature of the experiment (FIRST and 
TENT). We exclude all demographic variables because there is no significant 
difference due to gender (chi2; p = 0.97) and the variables AGE and first are 
significantly correlated (Pearson coefficient; p < 0.05).  
 
Probit Model - R3  
 
Variables            EQFOEE      Marginal Effects        
 
OT   -0.48**  -0.18       
  (0.242)        
FIRST  0.32     0.118     
  (0.247)    
TENT  -0.09     -0.03 
  (0.069) 
     
Constant  0.01   
  (0.253)    
 
N    120         
Log Likelihood    -74.073703 
LR chi2(3)    8.44 
Prob > chi2    0.0539     
 
** significance 5% 
 
From (R3) it turns out that subjects are more likely to expect compliance of 
the co-players in the AT. 
   31 
1 2 1 1 1 i i i i i v FIRST TENT OT EQFOEE + + + = φ φ ω  
2 3 2 i i i i v AGE EQFOEE EQCHOICE + + = φ δ  
(R4) 
 
As in the comparison between the BT and the AT, we compare the AT and the 
OT by running a bivariate recursive probit (R4) where EQCHOICE is equal to 
1 if choice corresponds to the voted rule.  
 
 Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R4 
 
Variables            EQFOEE      EQCHOICE        
 
OT   -0.47**         
  (0.243)        
FIRST  0.40         
  (0.27)     
AGE      0.05 
      (0.057) 
TENT  -0.07 
  (0.092) 
EQFOEE      2.39*** 
      (0.945) 
     
Constant  -0.09    -2.065 
  (0.342)   (1.284) 
 
N    120         
 
Log Likelihood    -133.37077 
 
Rho    -0.51 
 




** significance 5% 
 
From (R4) it turns out that the introduction of the mixed protocol influences 
empirical  expectations  and  that  empirical  expectations  influence  subjects’ 
decisions. Moreover, as rho is not significantly different from 0, we can affirm 
that there is no latent variable that may influence beliefs and choice at the 
same time.  
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